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Towards a History of the Baha’i Community of 
Iran during the Reign of Mohammad Reza Shah 
(1941-1979)1
Mina Yazdani
Assistant Professor of History, Eastern Kentucky University 
Introduction
With the spread of the Baha’i religion in Iran since its tumultuous birth in that 
country in the middle part of the nineteenth century, the persecution of its followers 
has been a part of Iranian history.2 As Abbas Amanat has shown, during the Qajar 
period (1785-1925), anti-Babi pogroms and campaigns usually occurred during 
provincial or national crises such as those caused by harvest failures, famines, and 
epidemics. The Babis (and later Baha’is) served as scapegoats to cover the state’s 
failure in relation to European economic and political intrusion. Drawing the 
attention of the public to the evils of this ‘devious sect’ served to consolidate the 
relationship between the Qajar government and the clergy.3 With the rise of Reza 
1I wish to thank Omid Ghaemmaghami for his 
editorial comments. I have used a modified 
version of the Library of Congress system of 
transliteration sans diacritical marks and un-
derdots. For certain famous personalities (e.g., 
Mohammad Reza Shah), I have used the most 
common spelling of their names even if such 
spelling does not comply with the Library of 
Congress system of transliteration.
2For multiple articles on various aspects of the 
Baha’i faith, see Encyclopedia Iranica, s.v. “Ba-
ha’i Faith or Bahaism.” 
2For multiple articles on various aspects of the 
Baha’i faith, see Encyclopedia Iranica, s.v. 
“Baha’i Faith or Bahaism.” 
3Abbas Amanat, “The Historical Roots of the 
Persecution of Babis and Baha’is in Iran,” in 
The Baha’is of Iran: Socio-Historical Studies, 
Dominic Brookshaw and Seena Fazel, eds. 
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2007), 170-183.
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Shah to power, physical assaults, including murder, against Baha’is considerably 
decreased but did not cease. In 1926, angry mobs killed somewhere between eight 
to twelve Baha’is in Jahrum. The attacks were apparently instigated by a majlis 
representative who sought to gain favor with anti-Baha’i religious leaders in order 
to secure reelection. The Baha’is complained to the local and national authorities 
to obtain redress but were denied. This was the last incident of mass killing of 
Baha’is during Reza Shah’s reign.4 Although immunity from physical attacks 
was provided in the closing years of Reza Shah’s rule, the government forbade 
Baha’i meetings, closed Baha’i centers and Baha’i schools, and harassed Baha’is 
on matters concerning census forms, marriage certificates, and birth certificates. It 
also dismissed some Baha’i government employees and stripped several Baha’is 
serving in the army of their rank.5 The motivation behind such harsh measures might 
lie in Reza Shah’s determination “to subordinate all other loyalties to allegiance 
to his person,”6 or perhaps in his intention to avoid unnecessary friction with the 
ulama, that is, friction beyond what was inevitable for the implementation of his 
“modernizing” ideas. With Reza Shah’s forced abdication and Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s accession to the throne in 1941, the influence of the ulama resurged, and a 
new era began. Historical narratives published in Iran after the Islamic Revolution 
usually depict the Baha’is in the Pahlavi period as living an imagined state of 
comfort and bliss, partaking of privileges denied to other citizens.7 Careful study 
of the primary sources, however, paints a different picture. Moving away from 
simplistic and monolithic narratives, this paper will investigate the multi-layered, 
multi-faceted history of the Baha’i community of Iran during the reign of the last 
Pahlavi monarch. I will argue that the situation of Baha’is during Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s reign (1941-1979) went through different phases. The first phase, from1941 
through 1955, was a period characterized by physical danger, during which Baha’is 
were scapegoated in the interactions among the government, the clerics and the 
people, and experienced several bloody incidents, the culmination of which was 
4Mina Yazdani, “Religious Contentions in Mod-
ern Iran, 1881-1941” (PhD Diss. University of 
Toronto, 2011), 229-230.
5Yazdani, “Religious Contentions in Modern 
Iran,” 237-38.
6Douglas Martin, “The Persecution of the Ba-
ha’is of Iran, 1844-1984,” Baha’i Studies, 12/13 
(1984), 20.
7In the last decade or so, in addition to numerous 
polemical works, books have been published in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran which in the guise 
of academic studies reproduce and reinforce 
the government’s official narrative about the 
life of Baha’is under Mohammad Reza Shah. 
Examples include: Mas‘ud Kuhistaninijad, 
Ruhaniyyat –Baha’iyan (nimah-yi avval-i sal-i 
1334 (Tehran: markaz-i asnad-i Inqilab-i Islami, 
1386); Suraya Shahsavari, Asnad-i fa‘aliyyat-i 
Baha’iyan dar dawrah-yi Mohammad Reza 
Shah (Tehran: markaz-I asnad-i Inqilab-i Islami, 
1378); Leila Chamankhah, Baha’iyyat va rijim-i 
Pahlavi (Tehran: Nigah-i Mu‘asir, 1391).
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the 1955 anti-Baha’i campaign and its aftermaths. The second phase, from the late 
1950s to around 1977, marked almost two decades of relative respite from physical 
attacks, during which Baha’is enjoyed more security than before, without ever 
being officially recognized as a religious community and while their existence as 
Baha’is was essentially ignored or denied. The last two years of the reign of the 
Shah comprised the third phase, the revival of a bloody period. It must be added that 
given the rather long span of the period under study, and the multi-faceted nature of 
the subject, this article can do no more than provide an overview. 
The 1940s and Early 1950s: Tumultuous and Bloody Years
The 1940s and early 1950s were tumultuous, at times, even bloody years, for the 
Baha’i community of Iran. After the relative suppression of their activities in the 
last years of Reza Shah’s reign, the mid-1940s coincided with new plans in the 
Baha’i community for pioneering (migrating to places with fewer or no Baha’is) 
and propagating their faith, inside as well as outside Iran.8 The 1940s also witnessed 
the re-empowerment of the Shi‘i clerics who largely viewed Baha’is as enemies 
of Islam, the relative weakness of the central government under the young and 
inexperienced king, and a judiciary system unwilling or incapable of protecting the 
Baha’is. The combination of these factors exposed Baha’is to episodes of severe 
persecution.
When the young Mohammad Reza Shah (d. 1980) acceded to the throne in 1941, 
among his strategies to consolidate power was appeasing the clerics.9 The astute 
politician, Muhammad Ali Furughi,10 told journalists in his press conference as 
the young Shah’s first prime minister, that “religion must also be supported” (bi 
din ham himayat bayad kard).11 Furughi played a pivotal role in strengthening the 
8The first organized plan for the expansion of 
the Baha’i faith began on 11 October 1946 (19 
Mihr 1324). See Encyclopedia Iranica, s.v. “Ba-
ha’i Faith or Bahaism v. The Baha’i Communi-
ty of Iran.”
9On Mohammad Reza Shah, see Gholam R. 
Afkhami, The Life and Time of the Shah (Berke-
ley, CA: University of California Press, 2009); 
‘Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: Palgrave and 
Mcmillan, 2011); Homa Katouzian, The Persians: 
Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Iran (New Hav-
en: Yale University Press, 2009), 229-287. On the 
Shah appeasing the clerics, Milani, The Shah, 99.
10On Furughi’s role in the transition of power/
kingship from RezaShah to his son see Katouz-
ian, The Persians, 230-231.
11[Ahmad Kasravi], Sarnivisht-i Iran chi kha-
had bud? 1st ed. (Tehran: Chapkhanah Urdibi-
hisht, 1324), 18. Available at www.kasravi.
info/ketabs/sarnevesht-e-iran.pdf (accessed 25 
June 2013). Writing four years into Mohammad 
Reza Shah’s reign, Kasravi, who published the 
book under the name of “An Iranian,” (yik Ira-
ni), went on to say that it was clear what Fu-
rughi meant by “supporting religion” and then 
blamed all the subsequent administrations, the 
contemporary newspapers and the Tudah Party 
for their support of the clerics.
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new monarch in the wake of the forced abdication of Reza Shah, and acted as an 
experienced advisor to the apprehensive young Shah. Supporting religion meant 
first and foremost backing the Shi‘i clerics. Fearful of the spread of Communism 
in Iran, and wary of experienced and strong politicians such as Ahmad Qavam (d. 
1955), the Shah forged strong ties with the clerics, the most prominent of whom 
was Ayatollah al-‘Uzma Haji Aqa Husayn Burujirdi (d. 1961), the sole marja‘-i 
taqlid of the Iranian Shi‘is between 1947 and 1961, who, as has been demonstrated 
elsewhere,12 was forcefully and unabashedly opposed to the Baha’i religion. The 
Shah and the Ayatollah would have several meetings, during which Burujirdi 
expressed his demands. Burujirdi played a key role in revitalizing the Hawza in 
Qum and led the seminary from the 1940s. In his position as head of the seminary, 
he sent seminary student to different parts of Iran with the aim of suppressing the 
Baha’is.13 What one of these emissaries, Ahmad Shahrudi, has recorded of Burujirdi’s 
words when dispatching him and two others, provides a possible explanation of the 
sporadic cases of murder of Baha’is in the 1940s and early 1955 in different parts 
of Iran. It also reflects the sense of power and immunity vis-à-vis the law that the 
Grand Ayatollah felt: “Go and kill them (Baha’is)! If you are able to, then do so and 
kill them! Kill and set your minds at ease (bikushid va itminan dashtih bashid).”14 
Along with the re-empowerment of the ‘ulama, many Islamic societies were formed, 
almost all with anti-Baha’i agendas, with many followers among the laity, not only 
in Tehran, but also in other cities such as Qum, Shiraz, and Mashhad.15 
12Mina Yazdani, “Islamic Ecumenism in 
Mid-Twentieth Century Iran: a Reaction to a 
Messianic Movement?” in the panel, “Mes-
sianism in Iranian Islam: From Conceptions to 
Re-Conceptions,” The Tenth Biennial Iranian 
Studies Conference, Montreal, Canada, 9 Au-
gust, 2014.
13Even before coming to such prominence, Aya-
tollah Burujirdi had managed, on occasions, to 
suppress Baha’is. Once in 1927, officials dis-
missed a Baha’i from his job as the assistant to 
the head of a local branch of a governmental 
office (birth registration office, Idarah-yi sabt-i 
ahval) in Burujird, and expelled Baha’is from 
that city, as the Ayatollah had wished. Moham-
mad Husayn ‘Alavi Tabataba’i, Khatirat-i zin-
digani-yi Ayatollah al-‘Uzma Aqa-yi Burujirdi 
(Tehran: Ittila‘at, 1341/1962), 36. See also the 
Ayatollah’s biography on his website Paygah 
ittila‘-rasani-yi Hazrat-i Ayatollah Burujirdi, 
www.broujerdi.org/content/view/12/140/ (ac-
cessed 25 June 2013).
14Ghulam-Riza Karbaschi, Tarikh-i shafahi-i in-
qilab-i Islami (tarikh-i hawzah-yi ‘ilmiyyah-yi 
Qum), 1st ed. (Tehran: Markaz-i Asnad-i In-
qilab-i Islami, 1380/2001), 1:162.
15See Markaz-i Asnad-i Riyasat-i Jumhuri, 
Asnadi as anjumanha va majami‘-i mazha-
bi dar dawrah-yi Pahlavi (Tehran: Saziman-i 
Chap va Intisharat-i Vizarat-i Farhang va Ir-
shad-i Islami, 2002/1381). For a thorough study 
of such societies and their goals, see Mohamad 
Tavakoli-Targhi, “Baha’isitizi va Islamgara’i 
dar Iran,” Iran Nameh 19, nos. 1– 2 (Winter/
Spring 2001), 79– 124; idem, “Anti- Baha’ism 
and Islamism in Iran,” trans. Omid Ghaem-
maghami, in The Baha’is of Iran: Socio- his-
torical Studies, ed. Dominic Parviz Brookshaw 
and Seena B. Fazel (London: Routledge, 2008), 
200– 31.
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In the first three years of Mohammad Reza shah’s reign, the persecutions ranged 
from expelling Baha’is from cities and villages; looting, raiding, plundering, stoning 
and burning down homes and places of work; and uprooting trees and the like. 
While harsh and brutal, these persecutions seldom involved acts of murder.16 Rather 
than proper prosecution and punishment of the offenders and their instigators, the 
government issued a circular that officially placed restrictions on Baha’i activities 
and prohibited Baha’i governmental employees from “teaching” their faith (which, 
for the most part, simply meant openly speaking about it).17 The government’s lack 
of prosecution, coupled with the circular, emboldened the religious zealots. As a 
result, the severity of the attacks increased. In Shahrud, following a full month 
of tension and threats, mobs attacked, looted and burned the homes and shops of 
Baha’is and brutally murdered three Baha’is in August 1944 (Murdad 1323).18 This 
was the beginning of more than a decade of episodes of sporadic killing of Baha’is 
coinciding with dispatches of clerics by Ayatollah Burujirdi to teach Islam in 
villages and towns. In the summer of 1947/1326, the young and successful engineer 
Abbas Shahidzadah and a fellow Baha’i, Habib Allah Hushmand, were murdered in 
Shahi and Sarvistan respectively; in 1949/1328, Dr. Sulayman Birjis was brutally 
murdered in Kashan,19and in 1950/1329, Ghulam Reza Akhzari and his son Nur 
Allah were killed near Yazd and Bahram Rawhani was murdered in Taft. More 
murders followed: in 1951/1330, in Najafabad, Muhammad Kayvani; in 1952/1331, 
in the village of Ramjin, near Qazvin, Nur al-Din Fatheazam; and in 1953/1332, in 
Luristan, Rahman Kulayni (these all being documented murders).20 In most of these 
cases, Baha’is were scapegoated during times of political or social crisis. In most 
instances, one or more clerics had instigated Shiites to commit acts of violence. 
Apart from the clerics, there were also lay anti-Baha’i individuals who abused their 
power in the service of their prejudices. It could not, for example, have been an 
16Even then sporadic cases of murder of Baha’is 
happened: in 1941/1320 in Ivil, Mazandaran, 
Mr. Jazbani, and in 1943/1322 in Ghahrukh, 
a village near Shahr-i Kurd, ‘Abd al-Husayn 
Rizvani. See Turaj Amini, Asnad-i Baha’iyan-i 
Iran, az sal-i 1320 ta payan-i 1331 (Stockholm, 
Sweden: Baran, 2012), 3-4.
17See the text of the circular in Amini, Asnad 
1320 ta payan-i 133, 491-92.
18For a firsthand account of the events in 
Shahrud, see: Y.P. Haqayiq-i guftani, dar pi-
yramun-i hadasah-yi nangin-i Shahrud va 
kushtar-i Baha’iyan bih dast-i Shi‘ayan (Teh-
ran: Parcham, 1945/1324). For primary sources 
pertaining to these events, see Amini, Asnad 
1320 ta payan-i 1331, 506-511, 516-527; 535-
617; Maymandinijad, “ Vaqi ‘ah-’i Shahrud,” 
Mard-i Imruz, 26 (27 Murdad 1323).
19For a detailed study of the murder of Dr. Birjis, 
see: Nasir Muhajir, “Kard-ajin kardan-i Dr. Bir-
jis,” Baran (Spring and Summer 1387/2008), 
10-24; See also: Mousa Amanat, Baha’iyan-i 
Kashan, ed. Noura Amanat-Samimi (Madrid, 
Spain: Nehal, 2012), 212-216.
20For the relevant documents see Amini, Asnad 
1320 ta payan-i 1331, 742-753, and 580-83, 
591, 594.
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accident that the same police officer named Fatimi was the head of the police office 
in 1944 in Shahrud, in 1947 in Shahi and in 1949 in Kashan, when each of the above-
mentioned episodes occurred without any police protection. Fatimi is reported to 
have ignored the appeals when the early signs of dangers had been observed and 
reported.21 Another example of the abuse of power by lay anti-Baha’i individuals is 
the unlawful imposition of an exorbitant tax, much higher than the actual value of 
the relevant properties, on the Baha’i community of Iran in the 1970s, mostly as a 
result of the anti-Baha’i attitudes of those in charge, particularly in the Ministry of 
Finance.22
In all of these cases, Baha’is filed complaints via legal channels and requested 
investigations. Officials seldom responded to the complaints, and investigations, 
when carried out, placed the blame at the feet of Baha’is for provoking such 
attacks by speaking openly about their religion.23 In some cases, officials refused to 
investigate the case because the complaint had been filed by the Baha’i institutions 
and the authorities believed responding to the complaint would be tantamount to 
officially recognizing the Baha’i institutions.24 Murderers, often acting collectively, 
21For example, immediately before the mur-
der of Dr. Birjis, when Baha’is in Kashan met 
Fatimi to express their worries about the pos-
sible consequences of fiery speeches delivered 
on the pulpit by a cleric who sought to instigate 
people against the “morally corrupt” Baha’is 
whose blood could be shed with impunity, he 
only assured them that nothing would happen. 
Ruh Allah Mihrabkhani, “Shahadat-i ductur 
Birjis,” Ahang-i Badi‘, no. 17, 4 (Isfand 1328/
Feb. Mar. 1950), 4. For his support of the as-
sailants in the 1323 Shahrud events, see Nasir 
Pakdaman, Qatl-i Kasravi, 2nd ed. (Sweden: 
Afsanah, 1998/1337), 86-87.
22Cyrus ‘Ala’i, “Tarikhchah-’i maliyat bar irs-i 
Hazrat-i Shoghi Rabbani vali-i amr-i Baha’i,” 
manuscript in private hands. An abstract of 
this article has been published in Cyrus ‘Ala’i, 
“Majara-yi amlak-i Shoghi Effandi,” in Iran 
dar ‘Asr-i Pahlavi, vol. 12, ed. Mustafa Alamu-
ti (London: Paka Press, 1992):232-38.
23See for example the 7 Bahman 1326 /8 Jan. 
1948 letter from the Minister of Interior to the 
governor-general of Fars, and the governors of 
a number of other cities. Amini, Asnad 1320 ta 
payan-i 1331, 796-97. Also see the letter writ-
ten by the Minister of Interior to the Prime Min-
ister Sa‘id on 23 Khurdad 1323/13 June 1944 
in Amini, Asnad 1320 ta payan-i 1331, 482-83.
24For example, on 10 Bahman 1328/30 Jan. 
1950, five days before the murder of Dr. Birjis, 
the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is 
of Iran, the governing body of that community, 
wrote to the Police Commissioner to draw his 
attention to the impending dangers for Baha’is 
living in Kashan and some other parts of Iran, 
and to request the police’s intervention, Akhbar 
Amri, no. 10 (1328/1950), 90-91. Rather than 
providing protection, the result of this and simi-
lar complaints made after the murder of Dr. Bir-
jis was that, Asad Allah ‘Alam (d.1978/1357), 
the Minister of the Interior, on 1 Isfand 1328/20 
February 1955 wrote to the Prime Minister, 
Mohammad Sa‘id, expressing concerns that 
official letters from the “Assembly of Baha’is” 
to the government offices would lend them 
“official recognition” thereby “instigating the 
prejudice of Muslims.” Therefore, ‘Alam sug-
gested to the Prime Minister that the Assem-
blies must be “categorically shut down.” See 
Amini, Asnad1320 ta payan-i 1331, 860. Also, 
the governor-general of Fars, Izz al-Mamalik 
Ardalan (d. 1987/1366) in the midst of the per-
secution of Baha’is in Sarvestan, frankly stated 
that he would “tear up” any letters of complaint 
written by a “Baha’i Assembly” and would
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were never punished. For example, the killers of Dr. Birjis, who had collectively 
confessed to his murder, were all exonerated due to “the lack of evidence.”25 In 
rare instances where the government arrested someone, collective action by a 
number of clerics exerted pressure on the government to release the culprits.26 In 
one exceptional instance where the killer of two Baha’i was put on trial and received 
a death sentence, the verdict was never carried out: in 1951, Muhammad Husayn 
Ansari confessed to the murder of two Baha’is, fifty-nine year old Ghulamriza 
Akhzari and his son Nur Allah. When Ayatollah Burujirdi heard that a Muslim was 
set to be executed for having murdered two Baha’is, he became extremely angry 
and sent his protégé, the then young Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to the Shah to 
request a stay of execution.27 This he did, as the accounts record.28
In other instances, the fact that the murderers usually acted collectively, and were 
supported by the radical Islamist group, Fada’iyan-i Islam, spared them from 
punishment. When the seventeen people who had killed Fatheazam were on trial, 
the Fada’iyan-i Islam gathered large sums of money from the Bazaar to hire a 
seasoned attorney to defend the killers. Twenty members of the terror organization 
attended the court hearing and threatened the family of the deceased outside the 
courtroom. A judicial system unwilling to oppose the Fada’iyan and unmotivated to 
defend the rights of the murdered Baha’is, exonerated the murderers who proceeded 
to collectively celebrate their victory in the company of the prominent cleric 
Muhammad Bihbahani. 29
only pay attention to complaints coming from 
individuals without any mention of the name 
Baha’i. Aman Allah Ardalan (Izz al-Mama-
lik),Khatirat-i Hajj Izz al-Mamalik Ardalan: 
zindigi dar dawran-i shish padishah (Tehran: 
Khurshid, 1993/1372), 315-16, quoted in Mu-
hajir, “Kard-ajin,” 18.
25For details, see Muhajir, “Kard-ajin,” 20-21.
26For the role Ayatollahs Burujirdi, Kashani, 
Bihbahani and a number of other clerics played 
in freeing the murderers of Dr. Birjis, see Rasul 
Ja‘fariyan, Jaryanha va sazimanha-yi mazha-
bi-siyasi-i Iran, az ruyi kar amadan-i Moham-
mad Reza Shah ta piyruzi-i Inqilab-i Islami, 
salha-yi 1320-1357, 6th ed. (Qum: published by 
the author, 2006/1385), 162. Ja‘faryan’s source 
is the memoirs of one of the murderers: “Khati-
rat-i Gulsurkhi,” Yad, no. 6, 45-46.
27See Husayn ‘Ali Muntaziri, Matn-i kamil-i 
Khatirat-i Ayat Allah Husayn ‘Ali Muntaziri 
bi hamrah-i Payvast ha (n.p.: Union of Iranian 
Editors in Europe, 1379/2001), 94; Khatirat-i 
Mas‘udi Khomeini Javad Imami, ed. (Tehran: 
Markaz-i Inqilab-i Islami, 1381/2002), 221; 
Mohammad Taghi Afnan, Bigunahan, Man-
uscript in private hands, 245-249. Ja‘fariyan, 
Jaryanha,155.
28In the biography of Ayatollah Burujirdi there is 
mention of this murder and the rescue of the mur-
derer by the intervention of Ayatollah Burujirdi, 
without including the latter’s sending of Aytollah 
Khomeini to the Shah on this issue. See: ‘Alavi 
Tabataba’i, Khatirat-i zindigani, 81-85.
29Ahmad GulMohammadi, Jam‘iyyat-i fa-
da’iyan-i Islam bi ravayat-i asnad (Tehran: 
Intisharat-i Inqilab-i Islami, 1382/2003), 2:467, 
document number 253.
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While most of these murders did not attract much public attention, the murder 
of Dr. Birjis did, perhaps because of his prominence as a physician serving the 
deprived people of a small city, the bold way in which the murderers declared what 
they had done, and the judiciary’s blatant disregard for justice and the rule of law. 
An unprecedented wave of sympathy towards the victim swept over the country. 
The Society of the Physicians of Iran (Kanun Pizishkan-i Iran) wrote a letter to the 
Shah requesting that an investigation be opened and the culprits to be punished. 
Several newspapers and magazines wrote articles on the events. And Iranian 
students in Switzerland sent a cablegram to the State, attracting their attention to 
the international repercussions of such “savage” acts.30 It was perhaps in an attempt 
to dilute the sympathy, that shortly after, Baha’is faced the baseless accusation of 
murdering a Muslim woman and her five children in Abarqu in 1949/1328. The 
deliberate calumny lead to the arrest, unfair trial and years of imprisonment of a 
number of innocent Baha’is, the death of one of them in prison, and the execution of 
an innocent Muslim who the authorities refused to believe was a Muslim (and not a 
Baha’i), despite his many pleas.31
After the coup d’etat of 1953, with the Shah indebted to prominent clerics such 
as Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Kashani and Ayatollah Muhammad Bihbahani for their 
support during the coup, clerics were given greater latitude to persecute Baha’is. 
According to one account, in an attempt to show his gratitude to Ayatollah Kashani, 
the Shah sent the high-ranking officer Batmanqilich to ask if he had any specific 
requests. The Ayatollah called for the Baha’i Center in Tehran to be demolished.32 
Ayatollah Burujirdi, who had finally taken the Shah’s side in 1953, likewise 
demanded from the Shah to suppress the Baha’is, as discussed below.
The 1955 Anti-Baha’i Campaign and its Aftermaths 
Ayatollah Burujirdi’s own account of his interactions with the Shah in the lead up to 
the 1955 anti-Baha’i campaign highlights court-clerics relationship at the time and 
the ways in which Baha’is served as pawns in this interaction:
30For all the relevant documents, see Suhrab 
Nikusifat, Sarkub va kushtar-i digarandishan-i 
mazhabi dar Iran, vol. 1, az Safaviyyah ta In-
qilab-i Islami (Alzette, Luxembourg: Payam, 
2009/1388), 397-407.
31For details, see Afnan, Bigunahan, 51-214; 
Nikusifat, Sarkub va kushtar, 1:414-38; Amini, 
Asnad az 1320 ta payan-i sal-i 1331, 900-915 
and passim. 
32Ghulamriza Musavvar-i Rahmani, Kuhnah 
sarbaz: khatirat-i siyasi va nizami-yi sarhang-i 
sitad, Ghulamriza Musavvar-i Rahmani, 
(1374/1995 repr., Tehran: Mu’assasah-’i kha-
damat-i farhangi-’i rasa, 1366/1987), 363-364.
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Whenever I met with the Shah, I emphasized that he must put an end to [the 
activities of] this misled and misleading (zallah-yi muzillah) sect. [The Shah] 
promised [he would do so], but did not keep his word. In a subsequent visit, I 
pressured him [to act]. He responded: “I am unable to do so. You must help [me]. 
I said: “What authority do I have? All the power is in your hands.” He responded: 
“Ask people to write and complain. When the complaints are forwarded to me, 
I will have just cause to act.” It was not a bad idea. After that visit, we urged 
people in various provinces to write letters of complaint against (the Baha’is). 
When Ramadan arrived, we told Mr. Falsafi to give speeches attacking and 
condemning them. Because of these steps, the Shah ordered Batmanqilich33 to 
destroy the Hazirat al-Quds (the national Baha’i center in Tehran).34 
The rest of the 1955 story is well-known.35 The Shah sanctioned36 Burujirdi’s 
disciple, the skilled orator Hujjat al-Islam Falsafi to deliver a series of fiery 
36 
33Major-general (sarlashkar) Nader Bat-
manqilich (d. 1991), the head of the Iranian 
Army at the time.
34Mujtaba Ahmadi, et al., eds., Chashm va chi-
ragh-i marja‘iyyat: musahibahha-yi vizhah-’i 
majallah-’i hawzah ba shagirdan-i Ayatollah 
Burujirdi (Qum: Daftar-i Tablighat-i Islami-i 
hawzah-’i ‘ilmiyyah’-i Qum, 1379/2000), 55.
35What is less known, however, is Mahdi 
Ha’iri’s account of the role played by Kho-
meini in the process. Ha’iri, a philosopher and 
politician born to a high-ranking clerical fam-
ily, related by marriage to Ayatollah Khomei-
ni’s son and a student and close friend of the 
Ayatollah, reported a critical meeting between 
Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shah, shortly be-
fore or during the 1955 anti-Baha’i campaign. 
According to Ha’iri, Khomeini recounted that 
he was sent by Ayatollah Burujirdi to ask the 
Shah to crack down on the Baha’is. Khomeini 
told the Shah: “His Majesty, the late king, your 
father, tied this wayward and misguided sect 
[firqah-yi zallah] in the stable; the people of 
Iran expect the same from you now.” According 
to Ha’iri, Khomeini was happy with the out-
come of the meeting. See Habib Lajvardi, ed. 
Khatirat-i duktur Mahdi Ha’iri Yazdi (ustad-i 
falsafah, farzand-i bunyanguzar-i hawzah-yi 
‘ilmi-i Qum) (Tehran: Nader, 1381/2002), 56-
57. Historian Ervand Abrahamian considers the 
anti-Baha’i campaigns waged by the Pahlavis 
in the 1930s and again in the 1950s as evidence 
of their espousal of Shiism. Ervand Abrahami-
an, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), 19.
36Several hypotheses have been advanced on 
the reasons why the Shah gave consent to the 
suppression of the Baha’is, in 1955. Most agree 
that he sought to appease the ulama. On the 
one hand, the Shah was indebted to prominent 
fiercely anti-Baha’i clerics like Ayatollah Abu 
al-Qasim Kashani and Sayyid Mohammad Bih-
bahani for having supported the 1953 Coup. On 
the other, he was wary of Soviet and Commu-
nist influence at the height of the Cold War and 
wanted to align the country closer to the West to 
ensure the survival of his reign. He planned, af-
ter the anti-Baha’i campaign, to join the Amer-
ican sponsored Baghdad Pact, later known as 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), [a mu-
tual defense and economic cooperation pact 
among Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, with the par-
ticipation of the United Kingdom and later the 
United States as associate members] which he 
suspected would likely trigger the opposition of 
the ulama to what they commonly perceived as 
a growing dependency upon the West and the 
threat of increasing Western cultural influence. 
Moreover, he “had already accepted a propor-
tion of oil revenues below the level nationalists 
considered respectable.” Roy Mottahedeh, The 
Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in 
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speeches against the Baha’is, which were broadcast at noon every day during the 
month of Ramadan when religious fervour was at a peak. Falsafi’s talks unleashed 
a wave of anti-Baha’i violence across the country. In smaller towns and localities, 
incited mobs raided, plundered and burned houses and other buildings belonging 
to Baha’is, destroyed Baha’i cemeteries, threatened many Baha’is with rape and 
murder (actually raping some), forced many Baha’is into mosques in order to force 
them to recant their faith, and coerced others to publicly declare their recantation in 
the press. Some children and youth were expelled from school. Many government 
employees were fired.37 In some localities, such as Najafabad, the clerics forbade 
trading with Baha’is.38 In others, they separated women from their husbands and 
forced them to marry Muslims.39 In Tehran, the army occupied the Baha’i Center, 
and high ranking military officials and clerics jointly demolished its dome,40 an 
action some contemporaries interpreted as the state’s way of preventing a full-
blown Baha’i massacre.41 When rumours spread that the state would not protect 
Baha’is from assaults, mobs killed seven Baha’is in the village of Hurmuzak on 
28 July 1955.42 Prior to the event, Baha’is in Hurmuzak had made frequent appeals 
to the authorities. The law-enforcement officers present in the village not only did 
not assist them but in fact participated in the persecution.43 
Iran, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2008), 
239. The government was also facing serious 
economic problems and the anti-Baha’i cam-
paign could distract attention from those prob-
lems. Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics 
in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations 
in the Pahlavi Period (Albany, NY: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 1980), 77. Michael 
Fischer also interprets the events within the 
context of the economic difficulties that ensued 
after the 1953 coup and the government’s ef-
fort to buy off right-wing clerics. Michael M.J. 
Fischer, Iran, from Religious Dispute to Rev-
olution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1980), 187. A different explanation has 
been offered by Sir Denis Wright, the British 
Charge d’Affaires in 1955. He states that the 
Shah was blackmailed to sanction the persecu-
tion of the Baha’is because the ulama had pic-
tures of Queen Soraya in a bikini and newspa-
per accounts of an alleged son of the Shah born 
to a “well-known American socialite” and were 
threatening to publicize these and raise an up-
roar. Therefore, the Shah agreed that they could 
attack the Baha’is. Milani, The Shah, 199. 
Milani’s source is “The Memoirs of Sir Denis 
Wright, 1911-1971,” 1:280.
37Shoghi Effendi, Tawqi` 113 (manuscript in 
private hands), provides a summary of the 
events.
38See Muntaziri, Matn-i kamil-i Khatirat, 94-
95.
39Ja‘fariyan refers to one such instance without 
specifying its time. See Ja‘fariyan, Jaryanha, 
373-374.
40Tavakoli-Targhi, “Bahaisitizi,” 104-10 ; 
Akhavi, Religion and Politics, 76-87.
41Hishmat Shahriari, Interview, A Quiet Geno-
cide, aquietgenocide.com/index.php/compo-
nent/k2/117 (accessed 25 Oct. 2014).
42See the 14 Dey 1344 (5 Jan. 1956) delibera-
tions of the majlis on the event in Ruznamah-
’i rasmi-i kishvar-i shahanshahi-i Iran: goo.
gl/3eSOlM. For an account of the event see 
Mohammad Labib, The Seven Martyrs of Hur-
muzak, trans. and foreword, Moojan Momen 
(Oxford: George Ronald, 1981).
43See Labib, The Seven Martyrs, 4-5, 13-15, 
and passim. 
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From the beginning of the persecutions, in the same manner in which they responded 
to earlier episodes of abuse in the 1940s, the National Spiritual Assembly of the 
Baha’is of Iran lodged several appeals for protection and justice with the Iranian 
authorities. Shortly after the assaults began, on 9 May 1955, the National Spiritual 
Assembly addressed the Prime Minister of Iran, protesting the fact that government-
sponsored radio stations such as Radio Tehran and the radio of the Air Force had 
vilified and misrepresented the Baha’is. In the same letter, the National Spiritual 
Assembly explained some of the Baha’i beliefs and principles, emphasizing 
that Baha’is were not “negligent of God,” unconcerned about their country, and 
“bereft of a moral code and a standard of ethics,” as the two speakers, Falsafi and 
Shikuhzadah, had claimed. The Assembly closed their letter by mentioning that 
the Baha’i international community had been recognized as a non-governmental 
organization at the UN. They, furthermore, drew attention to the basic human right 
to fundamental freedoms (which included freedom of religion) as defined in the 
Charter of the United Nations, to which Iran was a signatory, and demanded that the 
authorities intervene to prevent assaults against Baha’is.44
Baha’i institutions around the globe also sent telegrams and letters of appeal to 
Iran, addressing the Shah, the Prime Minister and, in some cases, the Senate. For 
example, on 24 May 1955, an initial set of cablegrams were sent, appealing the 
authorities to turn their attention to the plight of the Baha’is in Iran. The cablegrams 
were followed two days later by letters with further details. These cablegrams and 
letters clarified that the Baha’is were neither hostile to the government nor opposed 
to Islam, the two main charges leveled against them in the speeches broadcast on 
the radio and in other media outlets. They also emphasized that Baha’is of all lands 
regard Iran as a place of pilgrimage. Finally, they appealed the rights of Baha’is in 
Iran to be protected.45 Aware of how sensitive the Iranian regime—and in particular 
the Shah—was about its public image, the authors of the cablegrams stressed their 
shock at reading about the persecution of the Baha’is of Iran in the press. The letters 
44The author is grateful to the Research De-
partment of the Universal House of Justice 
for sharing a copy of this letter and a number 
of other letters that will be discussed in this 
Section.
45Cablegram from the National Spiritual As-
sembly of the Baha’is of the United States to 
Mohammad Reza shah Pahlavi, dated 24 May 
1955; Cablegram from the National Spiritual 
Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States 
to the Prime minister of Iran, dated 24 May 
1955; Cablegram from the National Spiritual 
Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States to 
the Senate of Iran, dated 24 May 1955; Cable-
gram from the National Spiritual Assembly of 
the Baha’is of Egypt and Sudan to Mohammad 
Reza shah Pahlavi, dated 24 May 1955; Cable-
gram from the National Spiritual Assembly of 
the Baha’is of Egypt and Sudan to the Prime 
Minster of Iran, dated 24 May 1955.
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went on to provide further details. For example, in their letter to the Shah, the 
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States emphasized that 
their “information concerning the actions taken by the Iranian Government against 
the Baha’is” had been “gathered from the public press,” adding that this news had 
been published “in many American cities.”46 They also informed Prime Minister 
‘Ala that news about the suppression of Baha’is was “widely reported” in “the 
public press.”47 As the campaign of lies and misrepresentations in the media and the 
persecution of Baha’is in the country continued, and after previous communications 
were ignored, more letters were addressed to the Iranian government. This time, 
the missives reminded recipients of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
cognizant of the regime’s concern about its public image among the nations of the 
world: “As signatory to the charter and Bill of Human Rights, Iran has assumed a 
responsibility in the eyes of the entire world,” wrote the representatives of American 
Baha’is.48 The National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Egypt and Sudan wrote 
to Mohammad Reza Shah on 1 June 1955 that it had learned, “through the press,” 
of the “shocking news” of attacks launched against Baha’is. Expounding on the 
Baha’i teachings in order to correct the distortions, inventions and lies levelled 
against the Baha’is, the letter lamented the fact that the “high reputation” Iran enjoys 
among Baha’is has been “injured” by the aggression committed against Baha’is, and 
added that the “persecutors disregarded the welfare of their country and rendered 
themselves violators of human rights and freedom.” In their letter to the Prime 
Minster, also dated 1 June 1955, the representatives of the Baha’is of Egypt and 
Sudan called his attention to “[t]he Charter of Human Rights declared by the United 
Nations and unanimously approved by all the civilized countries including Iran.”49
The numerous appeals, in particular those written outside Iran, at last bore fruit and 
the harshest attacks ceased for some time (albeit not completely as we will see). 
The government found that it could no longer comply with the wish of the ulama 
to effect or sanction extermination of the Iranian Baha’i community once and for 
46Letter from the National Spiritual Assembly 
of the Baha’is of the United States to Moham-
mad Reza Shah, dated 26 May 1955.
47Letter from the National Spiritual Assembly 
of the Baha’is of the United States to the Prime 
Minster of Iran, dated 26 May 1955.
48Letter from the National Spiritual Assembly 
of the Baha’is of the United States to Moham-
mad Reza Shah Pahlavi, dated 26 July 1955.
49In addition, Mildred Mottahedeh the repre-
sentative of the Baha’i International Communi-
ty complained of the persecutions at the United 
Nations. Iran’s representative, Rizazadah-sha-
faq, denied the allegations altogether, and 
claimed that very few Baha’is were living in 
Iran. Afnan, Bigunahan, 264 --a response that 
shows the regime’s after the fact awareness of 
how the campaign could jeopardize the human 
rights records of the country.
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all.50 As Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi has demonstrated in his study of the episode, the 
1955 anti-Baha’i campaign was both the apogee of the state-cleric collaboration and 
the point of their separation.51 
The appeals, with their emphasis on the charter of human rights, would have far-
reaching effects. It was perhaps, at least partly, as a face-saving, compensatory move 
triggered by the fear of becoming known internationally as a government that does 
not protect its own people that the Shah’s regime grew particularly concerned with 
championing human rights. Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, the twin sister of the Shah, 
was even designated as the Chair of the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1965. 
Three years later, the first UN International Conference on Human Rights was held 
in Tehran between 22 April and 12 May 1968 (2-22 Urdibihisht 1347).52 
Late 1950s to 1977-78: Relative Safety 
In addition to the government, particularly the Shah himself, becoming concerned 
with the regime’s reputation beyond Iran’s frontiers, the gradual consolidation of the 
Shah’s power, and the relative separation between the government and the clerics 
provided Baha’is with more safety. The incidents of plunder, looting, and murder 
dropped in number, though they never ceased.53 The last sporadic murders (before 
1977/1356) occurred in 1958/1337 when three Baha’is were killed: Nusrat Allah 
Mavaddati in Qurvah, Ardishir Rawhani in Khash, and Mirza ‘Ali-Akbar Khan 
Safa’i in Khalajabad-i Arak.54 One other wave of raiding and looting coincided with 
public demonstrations in support of Khomeini on 5 June 1963/15 Khurdad 1342. 
On that day, in the tradition of almost all socio-political upheavals in Iran, in a 
number of cities and localities, mobs attacked Baha’i properties. In Tehran, mobs 
raided the Baha’i cemetery, committed arson, and broke some of the grave stones. 
50For details, see Tavakoli-Targhi, “Baha-
isitizi,”107-110.
51Tavakoli-Targhi, “Bahaisitizi,”110.
52For an analysis of the socio-historical context 
of the conventing of this conference in Tehran 
and its connection with the emergence of a co-
herent historical grand narrative of tolerance 
and inclusivity, see Mohammad Tavakoli-Tar-
ghi, “ See “Charkish-i tamadduni, tasamuh-i 
Kurushi va ‘mutisavi al-huquqi’ shahrvandi,” 
Iran Nameh, 30:2 (Summer 2015), 52-119, spe-
cifically 105-113.
53For a list of persecutions in the year 
1958/1337, see Akhbar-i Amri, no. 1-3 (Far-
vardin, Urdibihisht, Khurdad 1338), 63-71; 
Turaj Amini, Asnad-i Baha’iyan-i Iran, az 
sal-i 1332 ta inqilab-I Islami (Sweden: Baran, 
2014/1393), 863-69. For a similar list in the 
year 1959/1338, see Akhbar-i Amri, no. 1-4 
(1339), 99-111; Amini, snad az sal-i 1332ta 
inqilab, 872-80. For a concise overview of the 
life of Baha’is in Iran under the Shah after the 
1955 anti-Baha’i campaign, see Geoffrey Nash, 
Iran’s Secret Pogrom (Sudbury, UK: Neville 
Spearman, 1982), 44-53.
54See Akhbar-i Amri, nos. 1-3 (Farvardin, 
Urdibihisht, Khurdad 1338), 63-71; on the 
murder of ‘Ali Akbar Safa’i, also see Akhbar-i 
Amri, nos. 7 and 8 (Mihr, Aban 1338), 237-41; 
Amini, Asnad az sal-i 1332ta inqilab, 869-72.
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In Kashan, they plundered the Baha’i center and the homes and shops of Baha’is. 
Eight families lost all their belongings. The culprits were arrested but were released 
in a few days with no trial or punishment.55 In Aran va Bidgul in the province of 
Isfahan, demonstrators raided and plundered the homes of Baha’is.56 In Isfahan, 
Shiraz, Saysan and elsewhere, however, the intervention of law enforcement forces 
prevented mobs from carrying out further attacks.57 From around this time to the last 
two years of Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule, for some thirteen years, Iranian Baha’is 
lived in a state of relative peace. 
The absence of physical violence (murder, mass attacks, plunder, looting, arson, etc.) 
against Baha’is from the mid-1960s to 1977-78 can be traced to the dominance in Iran 
in this period of what Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi refers to as a “rights-based account of 
Iranian history,” fundamentally different from the earlier accounts which emphasized 
ethnic and language purity. This “tolerance-based” civilizational account, Tavakoli-
Targhi argues, “synthesized the pre-Islamic and the Islamic pasts into an organic and 
other-accommodating whole.” It claimed that Iranian culture and Islam embodied the 
principles set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The coupling of the 
Cyrus Cylinder with the latter, Tavakoli-Targhi adds, “made possible the telling of a 
multi-confessional, multi-ethnic, and multi-lingual civilizational narrative.”58 
Certainly, for the Shah, who considered himself the heir to Cyrus the Great, whom he 
told to “sleep in peace” because he was “awake” during the 2,500-year celebration 
of the Persian Empire,59 it was only natural to see himself as the new monarchical 
55Akhbar-i Amri no. 5, year 42 (Murdad 1342), 295.
56Electronic communication with the eye wit-
ness of the events, Mohammad Mahdavi far, 
28 Tir, 1392 nurizad.info/?p=22128#com-
ment-121926.
57Akhbar-i Amri no. 5, year 42 (Murdad 1342), 
299.
58Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, “Archaeotopia: 
The Cyrus Cylinder and the De-confession-
alization of Iranian Identity,” paper presented 
at the symposium, “The Legacy of Cyrus the 
Great: Iran and Beyond,” Freer Gallery of Art 
and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian 
Institution (Washington, 27 April 26 2013). An 
updated and extended version of the paper in 
Persian has been published in Iran Nameh: Ta-
vakoli, “Charkish-i tamadduni.” What Muham-
mad Reza Shah wrote in the last year of his life, 
supports Tavakoli-Targhi’s analysis. Referring 
to “the sacred principles of Islam,” he described 
them as “the most progressive religious princi-
ples.” He added, however, that his desire for the 
spirit of Islam to “penetrate ever more into the 
soul of our people was not accompanied by any 
animosity towards other religions.” He then 
added, “history will one day show that one of 
the characteristics of my reign was tolerance. 
Iran since the time of Cyrus has always been 
a land of refuge…” Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 
Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 
1980), 61.
59For a discussion of Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
proclamation of himself as a modern Cyrus, 
see Katouzian, The Persians, 263; Ali M. An-
sari, Modern Iran: The Pahlavis and After, 2nd 
ed. (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2007), 175. For a 
discussion of the 2,500-year celebration, the 
Shah’s speech at the mausoleum of Cyrus the 
Great, and the international media’s coverage 
of the event, see Ansari, Modern Iran, 218-222.
Iran Namag, Volume 2, Number 1 (Spring 2017)LXXX
champion of human rights. As mentioned earlier, Baha’i institutions both inside, and 
more importantly, outside Iran, in all the letters of appeal they sent to the Iranian 
government and the Shah himself, reminded the recipients of Iran’s official approval 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948. 
No Right to Work According to the Law 
The absence of mob attacks and major physical assaults did not by any means 
guarantee full civil rights to Baha’is, even in this phase. For example, with regards 
to the right to work, the pattern for Baha’i (un)employment remained almost 
the same throughout Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign: Baha’is were not eligible 
for employment in any government positions.60 The implementation of this law, 
however, varied in different times and places, depending largely on the attitude of 
those tasked with implementing the law. 
In some sectors, like the army or primary and secondary education, the employment 
of Baha’is was particularly restricted. Baha’is who were employed in the army 
usually had technical jobs, such as medical doctors, accountants or engineers. In 
addition to the limitations already present, Mohammad Reza Shah issued a special 
order on 1 December 1955/9 Azar 1334 barring new employment of Baha’is in the 
army, and forbidding those who were already in the army from publicly declaring 
[their faith] (nabayad tazahur kunand), at the risk of not being promoted.61
The Civil Employment Act (Qanun-i istikhdam-i kishvari), ratified on 22 May 
1966/31 Khurdad 1345, explicitly mentioned that lack of prior “convictions for 
espousing corrupt beliefs” was a condition of application for employment in 
governmental jobs. The executive regulations appended to the law by different 
branches of the government invariably required applicants to clarify their religious 
affiliation. Ads for governmental jobs always included, as a basic eligibility 
60For examples of how the implementation of 
the law could be influenced by the attitude of 
anti-Baha’i groups or individuals, see (1) the 
letter dated 8 Azar 1329/29 November 1950, 
written by Sirajansari, the head of the religious 
organization Ittihadiyah Muslimin to Prime 
Minister Razmara, thanking him for dismiss-
ing some Baha’is from government positions 
and requesting that all remaining Baha’is be 
likewise expelled. Markaz-i Asnad-i Riyasat-i 
Jumhuri, Asnadi as Anjumanha va Majamiʻ, 
36; and (2) the 15 Isfand 1328/ 6 March 1950 
letter of a group of devoted Muslims in Khu-
rasan to the Prime Minister, requesting that Ba-
ha’i employees be dismissed from educational 
institutes and fired from the hospital affiliated 
with the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad, 
Ibid. 283-84.
61Haqiqatpajuh, A’in-i Baha’i yik nihzat-i siyasi 
nist, (Germany: Mahfil-i Ruhani-i Milli-i Ba-
ha’iyan-i Alman, 1982/1361), 86.
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requirement, belief in one of the four “official religions of the country: Islam, 
Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism.” which basically meant that Baha’is 
were not allowed even to apply. However, the way such regulations were put into 
practice depended to a large degree on the attitude of the individuals directly in 
charge. Those who did not harbor anti-Baha’i sentiments accepted that Baha’is 
leave the religion column on forms blank. This seemed to have been the only way 
for a Baha’i to get a job in a government organization, and many did. Indicating 
one’s religion as Baha’i, however, would almost invariably lead to outright 
rejection of one’s application, unless the organization was semi-governmental 
(i.e., partly private). In the 1960s, when the internal security organization known as 
SAVAK62 took control of all government positions and began to screen applicants 
for government jobs, stricter measures were enacted. These years coincided 
with the early years of the premiership of Amir Abbas Hoveyda who “appears 
to have felt impelled to be particularly severe in his treatment of Baha’is”63 in 
face of accusations made by his political enemies that he himself was a Baha’i. 64 
According to SAVAK documents, only two weeks after Hoveyda became prime 
minister, SAVAK officials conveyed to him a number of suggestions, based on 
advice received from pro-Shah clerics, as ways of debunking the rumor that he 
was a Baha’i. One of these suggestions called on the prime minister to refrain 
from employing Baha’is in government offices.65 
Here, I would like to present three cases that shed light on the work conditions of 
Baha’is during Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign: 
(1) On 27 February 1966, a year into Hoveyda’s premiership, the nursing school of 
the National Oil Company dismissed 19-year-old student Minu Yazdani for having 
indicated four months earlier in her employment forms that she was a Baha’i.66 
When she appealed the decision to expel her before the administrative officials of 
the Oil Company, they told her the decision had been made based on a circular from 
62On SAVAK, see Gholam R. Afkhami, The Life 
and Times of the Shah, 381-403; Katouzian, 
The Persians 256.
63Borrowed from Martin, The Persecution of 
the Baha’is of Iran, 26-28.
64During his ministry, the Baha’i Center of 
Tehran which had been sealed off in 1955, re-
mained closed; frequently, Baha’i gatherings in 
different parts of the country were cancelled, 
and Baha’i employment in government offices 
were more strictly prohibited. See Haqiqatpa-
juh, A’in-i Baha’i yik nihzat-i siyasi nist, 79.
65See ‘Abd Allah Shahbazi, Zuhur va suqut-i 
saltanat-i Pahlavi, vol. 2, Justarha’i az tarikh-i 
muʻasir-i Iran (Tehran: Mu’assasah-’i Muta-
li‘at va Pazhuhishha-yi Siyasi, 1990), 388.
66Students of the nursing school of the Oil 
Company were employed from the beginning 
of their studies.
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the prime minister’s office that called for members of the “misled sect” (firqah-yi 
zzalah) employed after a certain date to be dismissed.67
(2) In 1969, Manuchihr Sharif al-Attiba, a young physician who applied for a 
psychiatry residency in a hospital affiliated with Tehran University, was denied 
admission for having identified himself as a Baha’i on the application form. Six years 
later, however, in July 1975, he was accepted for a psychiatry residency at Pahlavi 
(Shiraz) University, even though he again stated his religion on the application 
forms.68 This example shows that the treatment Baha’is varied in different times 
and places.
(3) Colonel Husayn Vahad-i Haqq entered the army high school during the reign of 
Reza Shah. Later, he enrolled in the military university, studied military engineering 
and in the process learned several foreign languages. A high score on an exam 
administered in 1971 led to his being chosen to be sent to foreign countries as 
the military attaché of the embassy of Iran. The General in charge of the matter 
summoned Vahdat-i Haqq and told him that despite his high score on the exam, he 
could not be sent on the mission because of his religion. The only solution would be 
to change his religion in his file because, “this file must be signed by His Imperial 
Majesty, and he will not do so [if he sees you that have said that you are a Baha’i].”69 
Vahdat-i Haqq responded that if he accepted to lie about his religion, how could he 
then be trusted to not betray the Shah and his country by selling military secrets? 
Later, the General informed Vahdat-i Haqq that when reporting the case to the 
Shah, he conveyed Vahdat-i Haqq’s remarks to the monarch who in turn said, “He 
is right, he is right.” The Shah then approved Vahdat-i Haqq’s appointment as the 
military attaché of the embassy of Iran in Germany. Under the Islamic Republic, 
Vahdat-i Haqq was arrested and executed in 1982. This third example shows that the 
authorities did close their eyes when there was a need for the expertise of a Baha’i.
Baha’is and Positions of Power
On the positive side, during the reign of the second Pahlavi monarch, Baha’is for 
the most part (apart from a number of sporadic cases) were not denied the right 
67Hoveyda became the prime minister on 26 
January 1965 (6 Bahman 1343), and Minu 
Yazdani was dismissed from her nursing school 
on 27 February 1966 (8 Esfand 1344). This au-
thor’s personal interview with Minu Yazdani. 
The official letter of dismissal from her nursing 
school is in the author’s possession.
68This author’s personal interview with Dr. Ma-
nuchihr Sharif al-Attiba (Manshadi), 1 October 
2014.
69Mihri Vahdat-i Haqq (Haqiqatju), “‘Ishq-i 
bi-zaval,” Manuscript in private hands, 53-54. 
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to higher education. This fact, combined with the emphasis placed in the Baha’i 
religion on education led to a large number of Baha’is receiving advanced degrees. 
As we saw above, their expertise, if seriously needed, led in some cases to officials 
looking the other way on the question of religious identity, allowing some Baha’is 
to secure high-level positions (again, provided that they left the religion column on 
official forms blank).70 They were also permitted to be active in the private sector. 
As a result, a number of individual Baha’is became successful entrepreneurs and 
industrialists. 
In fact, among the factors that made the life of the Baha’is in Iran under Mohammad 
Reza Shah’s rule complex and uneven is that in the midst of the official discrimination 
in employment laws, there were a number of individual Baha’is who held prominent 
positions.71 In fact, when it came to public posts, Baha’is, as a matter of principle, 
could not accept any position that was political in nature or required membership 
in a political party.72 As we will see below, the only Baha’i who held a political 
position, General Sani‘i, ultimately had to choose between keeping his political 
position and being a member of the Baha’i community.
Much has been written of the Shah’s personal physician, General Dr. ‘Abd al-Karim 
Ayadi (d. 1980), being a Baha’i—a fact usually cited in anti-Baha’i polemics widely 
disseminated in Iran under the Islamic Republic to try and establish ties between the 
former regime, and particularly the monarch himself, and the Baha’is of Iran.73 Ayadi 
was a well-known Baha’i.74 More than merely a physician, he functioned as the Shah’s 
70For a good discussion of this topic, see H.E. 
Chehabi, “Anatomy of Prejudice: Reflections 
on Secular anti-Baha’ism in Iran,” in The Ba-
ha’is of Iran: Socio-Historical Studies (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2008): 184- 197. See pages 
190-91, in particular.
71The exaggeration of this fact has been used in 
the Islamic Republic to justify the persecution 
of Baha’is. A revealing example is the letter 
dated 26 Shahrivar 1360/17 September 1981, 
written on behalf of the Minister of Agriculture 
to a Baha’i employee declaring that his employ-
ment had been illegal to begin with, listing five 
prominent Baha’is of the time of the Shah as 
“traitors” to the country (suggesting that the ad-
dressee was to blame for believing in the same 
“fake cult” as them), and ordering the employee 
to return all compensation he had received to 
the state. See the document in Fereydun Vah-
man, Yik-sad va shast sal mubarizah ba diya-
nat-i Baha’i: gushah’i az tarikh-i ijtimaʻi-dini-i 
Iran dar dawran-i mu‘asir (Darmstadt, Germa-
ny: ‘Asr-i Jadid Publisher, 2009), 712. 
72For more on this topic, see Moojan Momen, 
“The Baha’i Faith and Politics,” paper present-
ed at the conference “Intellectual Othering and 
the Baha’i Question in Iran,” Toronto, 3 July 
2011, www.youtube.com/watch?v=QtVY1B-
W9s0A (accessed 11 April 2015).
73See for example, Shahsavari, Asnad-i fa‘ali-
yyat-i Baha’iyan, 135-36.
74While Dr. Ayadi definitely believed in the 
Baha’i religion, he was never a member of the 
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of 
Iran, the elected body leading the affairs of the 
Baha’i community, or even the Local Spiritual 
Assembly of the Baha’is of Tehran.
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“chief of staff, private secretary,” and “trusted emissary.”75 Officially, he was the Shah’s 
physician, a post that was not political in nature. Highly trusted by the Shah, he was 
the head of the Health Office of the army, a position that made him responsible for all 
medicinal purchases for both the army and the Organization of Social Insurance. The 
memoirs of an Iranian who, for a long time, directly observed the way Ayadi managed 
this task depicts him as highly diligent and responsible.76 While much has been written 
about Ayadi’s power and influence because of his proximity to the Shah, the fact is 
that during the anti-Baha’i campaign of 1955, when Baha’is needed protection most, 
he was sent to Italy for nine months, apparently to avoid instigating the clerics by 
the presence of a Baha’i in the Shah’s Court. Ironically, despite his position, he was 
subject to SAVAK surveillance—an indication of the strength of the “animus against 
Baha’is.”77As the political unrest grew in the country in the last year of his reign, the 
Shah removed Ayadi from his position as his personal physician. Ayadi left Iran before 
the victory of the Islamic Revolution.78
Next in line of people who were actually Baha’is and were given a prominent role 
under Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule was General Asad Allah Sani‘i (d.1998).79 
During the time when Muhamad Reza was the Crown Prince, Sani‘i was appointed 
75Abbas Milani, Eminent Persians: Men and 
Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, Syr-
acuse, 2008), 2: 1058-61. Most of what has be-
come public knowledge about Ayadi is based on 
the controversial memoirs of the Shah’s long-
time friend, General Husayn Fardust (d. 1987) 
written while in captivity under the Islamic 
Republic, edited and published posthumously: 
‘Abdollah Shahbazi, ed., Zuhur va suqut-i sal-
tanat-i Pahlavi, vol. 1, Khatirat-i artishbud-i 
sabiq Husayn Fardust (Tehran: Mu’assasah-’i 
Mutali‘at va pazhuhishha-yi siyasi, 1990). Mi-
lani convincingly refers to this work as “alleged 
memoirs,” and describes it rightly as “vitupera-
tive.” Milani, Eminent Persians, 548, 285.
76See Goel Cohen, ed., Az kargari ta karafa-
rini: zindiginamah va khatirat-i Jack Mahfar, 
az Jubarah in Isfahan to Tehran and Geneve 
in Swiss, 2nd ed. (Geneva, Switzerland: The 
Mahfar Cultural Foundation, 2011), 121-27, 
173-182. Also available at jmahfar.com/index.
html (accessed 12 June 2015). The book has 
also been translated into English by Abbas 
Nayeri and Nazanine Nayeri, as From Labor-
er to Entrepreneur: Memoirs of Jack Maher, 
from Joubareh in Esfahan to Tehran and Ge-
neva (Geneva, Switzerland: The Mahfar Cul-
tural Foundation, 2013), available at jmahfar.
com/books/english/ (accessed 12 June 2015). 
Mahfar depicts a picture of Ayadi much differ-
ent than the one presented by Fardust (see the 
previous note). While quite influential because 
of his access to the Shah, Mahfar’s Ayadi is 
quite wary not to abuse that power (Az kargari 
175). He only owns two villages in which he 
promotes agriculture while taking care of the 
medical needs of the villagers who are satisfied 
and happy with him (Az kargari 117), and in 
the process of the purchase of medicine, always 
makes the best deals for the Iranian government 
(Az kargari 122).
77Milani, Eminent Persians, 2:1061.
78Milani, Eminent Persians, 2:1061.
79On General Sani‘i, see his autobiography, 
Asad Allah Sani‘i, Yadha va yaddashtha (Mon-
treal: Farhang, 2009); Murtaza Mushir, Khati-
rat-i Sipahbud Asad Allah Sani‘i (Los Angeles: 
Ketab Corp, 2002).
History of the Baha’i Community of Iran during 1941-1979 LXXXV
the Head of his Office. Later, he became the Minister of War. Since this was a 
political position and Baha’is are not to accept such positions, he was advised by 
the Baha’i administration to resign. The Shah, however, refused to accept his letter 
of resignation. When he chose not to relinquish his position, he lost his Baha’i 
administrative rights.80 
The majority of prominent people in political positions, usually mentioned as 
Baha’is in the narrative of the Islamic Republic, were not Baha’is.81 Some came 
from Baha’i families or had Baha’i ancestors, but never identified themselves with 
the religion, and even openly expressed their allegiance to Islam.82 Such was the 
case with Amir ‘Abbas Hoveyda (d. 1979) whose grandfather was a Baha’i, but 
whose father had distanced himself from the religion, accepted a political position, 
and married a Muslim.83 Hoveyda was raised a Muslim, but that did not prevent 
the ulama from voicing dissatisfaction with his premiership. The Shah himself 
knew Hoveyda was not a Baha’i and is said to have been angered by rumors to 
the contrary.84 As mentioned earlier, in order to prove that he was not a Baha’i, 
Hoveyda took measures such as more strictly enforcing the law of government 
employment being restricted to Muslims and recognized religious minorities—
hence barring Baha’is. Ironically, however, he is also reported to have offered a 
well-known Baha’i, General ‘Ali Muhammad Khadimi (d.1978), who was the head 
80See the 27 August 1965 letter of the National 
Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran to the 
Universal House of Justice on this matter, cited 
in Turaj Amini, Asnad-i Baha’iyan-i Iran, as 
Sal-i 1332 ta Inqilab-i Islami (Sweden: Baran, 
2014), 1051. On the General losing his admin-
istrative rights, see Akhbar-i Amri 10 (1358), 
156.
81Among those usually referred to as Baha’is 
on totally baseless grounds are: Farrukhru Par-
sa (d. 1979), the Minister of Education; and 
General Ni‘mat Allah Nasiri (d. 1979), the head 
of the notorious SAVAK for thirteen years. The 
list varies depending on the source.
82Examples of ministers who had Baha’i par-
ents without ever identifying themselves as 
Baha’is include Mansur Ruhani (d. 1979), the 
Minister of Agriculture and Utilities (who was 
born to a Muslim mother and Baha’i father), 
and Mahnaz Afkhami (b. 1940), the Minister 
of Women’s Affairs (who had a Baha’i mother 
and a Muslim father). It is important to note that 
unlike other religions, being born into a Baha’i 
family does not automatically make one a Ba-
ha’i. One needs to declare his or her allegiance 
to Baha’i beliefs and principles in order to be 
identified as a Baha’i.
83On Hoveyda, see ‘Abbas Milani, The Persian 
Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of 
the Iranian Revolution, (London, UK: IB Tau-
ris, 2000). See also, Encyclopedia Iranica, s.v. 
“Hoveyda, Amir Abbas.”
84Mahmud Turbati Sanjabi, Nukhustvazir sih 
daqiqah-‘i pish darguzasht (Tehran: ‘Ata’i, 
1383/2004), 91. When Ehsan Naraghi men-
tioned the rumor to the Shah, he responded, 
“No. That is pure calumny. Hoveida [sic] is 
not a Baha’i. The people are talking nonsense.” 
Ehsan Naraghi, From Palace to Prison: Inside 
the Iranian Revolution, trans. (from French) 
Nilou Mobasser (Chicago: Ivon R. Dee, 2007), 
43. The fact that the Shah knew Hoveyda was 
not a Baha’i, however, did not prevent him 
from scapegoating the latter and imprisoning 
him in the turbulent last months of his rule, in 
the words of Naraqi, “to appease the masses.” 
Ibid., 42.
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of Iran’s national airlines (HOMA), the new post of Minister of Transportation, an 
offer which General Khadimi declined, clearly stating that his religious beliefs did 
not allow him to hold a political position.85
Another person who held political office and was not a Baha’i but is nonetheless 
introduced as one in historical narratives sanctioned by the Islamic Republic is 
Parviz Sabiti (b. 1936), the second in command of SAVAK. Sabiti was born into a 
Baha’i family, but his father had lost his rights to participate in Baha’i community 
affairs, and Sabiti himself never became a Baha’i. This fact was announced by the 
National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran on 15 Farvardin 1358/4 April 
1979.86 In a short autobiography apparently written when he sought to join SAVAK, 
Sabiti asserted that while his parents were Baha’is, he considered himself a Muslim 
from the start of high school.87 In an interview in recent years, however, he clarified 
that he did not believe in any religion and did not hesitate to make disparaging 
remarks about the Baha’i faith.88
Among the most successful Iranian Baha’is of this era was Habib Allah Sabit (d. 
1990), an entrepreneur and industrialist whose companies employed more than ten 
thousand people.89 He displayed keen business acumen from a young age and gradually 
amassed a fortune through innovative and productive ways. He brought television to 
Iran, only to see it taken over by the government. His wealth brought him into contact 
with influential people. In 1953, when he was in New York, Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
mother traveled there. Given the political situation in Iran at the time, the members of 
the Iranian Embassy were reluctant to receive her. Upon disembarking the ship, the 
Queen Mother broke her leg, and Sabit and his wife took her to the hospital and cared 
for her. This event marked the start of an amicable relationship between the couple and 
the Queen Mother that lasted many years.90 During the 1955 anti-Baha’i campaign, he 
tried to use his connections to mitigate the dangers that Baha’is faced.91 
There were a number of other wealthy Baha’is living in Iran during this period. The 
discussion of their social and financial activities is beyond the scope of this paper. 
85Personal e-mail communication with Mona 
Khadimi, ‘Ali Muhammad Khadimi’s daughter, 
11 Apr. 2015.
86See Haqiqatpajuh, A’in-i Baha’i yik nihzat-i 
siyasi nist, 79-81.
87See Shahbazi, Zuhur va suqut-i saltanat-i 
Pahlavi, 2: 450-51; Milani, Eminent Persians, 
1:287.
88See Irfan Qani‘ifard, Dar damgah-i hadisah 
(Los Angeles: Ketab, 2012), 2: 678-85.
89See Habib Sabit, Sarguzasht-i Habib Sabit 
(Los Angeles, 1993); Milani, Eminent Per-
sians, 2: 678-85. An English translation of this 
book is available at https://archive.org/details/
HabibSabetMem; See also, Encyclopedia 
Iranica, s.v. “Sabet, Habib.”
90See Habib Sabit, Sarguẕasht, 239-47.
91See Encyclopedia Iranica, s.v. “Sabet, Habib.”
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The acknowledgement of their existence, and the fact that they had the opportunity 
to prosper, however, is necessary for a realistic appraisal of the Baha’i community 
during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah.92
Anti-Baha’i Societies
Baha’is were also unofficially permitted to hold their own gatherings, provided 
they were low-key and did not draw public attention. At the same time, anti-Baha’i 
societies were supported by SAVAK to harass Baha’is and interrupt their meetings. 
The Anjuman-i Khayriyyah-’i Hujjatiyyah-’i Mahdaviyyat, or Anjuman-i Zidd-i 
Baha’iyyat93 was founded by Shaykh Mahmoud Halabi with the permission of 
the Grand Ayatollah Burujirdi, apparently right after the 1953 coup that reinstated 
Mohammad Reza Shah in power. The Anjuman, which listed non-involvement in 
politics as one of its principles, was supported by SAVAK—a well-documented fact.94 
The regime and SAVAK likely used the Anjuman as a conduit to channel the religious 
sentiments of the youth and distract them from dissident religio-political groups. Some 
sympathetic scholars and former members have tried to depict the Anjuman as a largely 
progressive and non-violent association.95 A more accurate depiction of its activities 
and their at times violent nature has been recorded by others among its members96 as 
well as by Baha’is who been physically attacked by the group. Baha’is, moreover, 
have noted that law enforcement officials have been unwilling to prosecute members 
of the Anjuman when the victims of their attacks were revealed to be Baha’is.97 The 
statement made by the reformist Muslim ‘Abd al-Karim Soroush as to why he left the 
Anjuman as a young man testifies to the fact that its activities included some physical 
violence which led the young Soroush to dissociate himself from it.98
92One individual frequently mentioned in 
anti-Baha’i polemics is Huzhabr Yazdani 
(d.1389/2010). See Milani, Eminent Persians, 
2: 799-807.
93In fact, the name usually used by this society’s 
members before the Islamic Revolution was 
Anjuman-i Zidd-i Baha’iyyat. See Michael M.J. 
Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, Debating Muslims: 
Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tra-
dition (Madison, WC.: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1990), 48. On the Pahlavi regime allow-
ing this society to function, see also Abrahami-
an, Radical Islam, 19.
94For the relationship between SAVAK and 
Hujjatiyyah see Ziya’ al-Din ‘Uliya-nasab 
and Salman ‘Alavi-nik, Jariyan-shinasi-i an-
juman-i Hujjatiyyah (Qum, Zulal-Kawsar, 
2006/1385), 115-140; for more documents on 
SAVAK supporting Hujjatiyyah, see Amini, 
Asnad-i Baha’iyan-i Iran, as sal-i 1332 ta in-
qilab-i Islami, 1048-1050.
95See Encyclopedia Iranica, s.v. “Hojjatiya.”
96See Mehdi Abedi’s description in “Shi‘ite 
Socialization in Pahlavi Iran: Autobiographical 
Sondages in a Postmodern World,” in Fischer 
and Abedi, Debating Muslims, 48-54.
97See Nader Saiedi, “Asibshinasi-i rawshan-
fikri-i Iran” Iran-i Emruz (23 March 2009), 
www.iran-emrooz.net/index.php/politic/
more/17686/ (accessed 11 Apr. 2015). 
98Quoted in ‘Uliya-nasab and ‘Alavi-nik, Jari-
yan-shinasi-i anjuman-i Hujjatiyyah, 104. 
Originally, published in the newspaper Ja-
mi‘ah, no. 100, 8 Tir 1377/29 June 1998.
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The Hujjatiyyah members were given free rein by SAVAK to disrupt Baha’i 
gatherings, although their main organizational duty was to find non-Baha’is who 
seemed to have been attracted to Baha’i ideas and try to convince them not to join 
the Baha’i community. Neither the collaboration of SAVAK nor the freedom to 
harass Baha’is was exclusive to Hujjatiyyah as an anti-Baha’i organization. The 
older organization, Anjuman-i Tablighat-i Islami, established in 1941 by ‘Ata Allah 
Shihabpur,99 is reported to have sought and obtained the support of SAVAK in 1972 
in its activities against the Baha’i community.100 
Many members of these anti-Baha’i organizations were schoolteachers. The childhood 
and early youth memories of this author in Shiraz is filled with memories from the late 
1960s to the mid-1970s of teachers from both elementary and secondary schools who 
attacked everything that Baha’is considered holy with no opportunity on the part of 
Baha’i students or their parents to defend their beliefs or protest the verbal abuse. 
Officially Non-Existent
Throughout the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, Baha’is as Baha’is did not have a social 
existence.101 With the exception of anti-Baha’i polemical works, the name “Baha’i” 
almost never appeared on TV or the radio or in newspapers, books, and magazines. In 
the extremely rare cases when Baha’is were alluded to in mass media, they were called 
“firqah-’i zallah” (the misguided sect). Even the most successful Baha’i entrepreneur, 
artist, or physician could not be publically identified as such. Baha’is were legally 
“non-persons” in Iranian public life.102 At one point, the representative of the Iranian 
delegation told the United Nations that there were no Baha’is in Iran.103 This fiction was 
maintained throughout the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah.104
1977-1978, Unsafe Again
The socio-political turmoil of the last two years of the reign of the Shah rekindled 
the pattern of Baha’i persecution during times of crisis. In May 1977, Ruh Allah 
99See Tavakoli-Targhi, “Baha’isitizi,” 91-92; En-
cyclopedia Iranica, s.v. “Anjoman-e Tabligat-e 
Islami.”
100The original document is dated 27 Aban 
1351/18 November 1972. It has been published 
in Mojahid 1, 84 (19 Khurdad 1359/9 June 1980); 
See also Encyclopedia Iranica s.v. “Anjoman-e 
Tabligat-e Islami.”
101This has been interpreted by some as a situation 
in which the Baha’i community had a de facto 
presence while de jure, this presence was denied. 
See Cyrus ‘Ala’i, “Tarikhchah-’i maliyat bar irs.
102Borrowed from Martin, persecution 14.
103As mentioned in footnote 48, following the 
1953 anti-Baha’i campaign, the Iranian delegate 
at the United Nations, Rizasadah-shafaq, claimed 
there were very few Baha’is in Iran. Fischer, how-
ever, records that the delegate, Mrs. Teimurtash, 
“told the United Nations of behalf of the Iranian 
delegation that there were no Baha’is in Iran.” 
Fischer, Iran, from Religious Dispute to Revolu-
tion, 187.
104Fischer, Iran, from Religious Dispute to Revo-
lution, 187.
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Taymuri was killed in the village of Fazil Abad near Gurgan.105 The murderers 
were arrested, but the actual trial was postponed numerous times. Finally, they 
were released upon getting a letter from the family of the deceased exempting the 
killers from any possible penalties or liabilities. Worried of the possibility that 
this indicated a new wave of persecutions, the National Spiritual Assembly of the 
Baha’is of Iran advised the Baha’is to pursue a legal course and appeal to the local 
or national government should they face persecution.106 On 7 November 1978/16 
Aban 1357, General ‘Ali Muhammad Khadimi was assassinated in front of his 
wife at their home. The assassins were most likely SAVAK agents.107 Less than two 
weeks later, the Islamist newspaper Sitarah-’i Islam [The Star of Islam] reported 
on 20 November 1978/29 Aban 1357: “Baha’is are the cause of problems in our 
country and must be punished.” The heightened religious fervor of the Islamists was 
accompanied by sporadic attacks on Baha’is, in different parts of Iran. In December 
1978, mob violence unleashed against Baha’is in the village of Sa‘diyyah near 
Shiraz extended to inside the city. From early December, with the beginning of 
the holy month of Muharram—when Shi‘i religious sentiments are usually at their 
most fervent—rumors began to spread in the suburbs of Shiraz about setting the 
city’s Baha’i Center and the homes of Baha’is on fire. The village of Sa‘diyyah 
was where these threats materialized. Sa‘diyyah was home to a mixed Baha’i and 
Muslim community with familial ties among families from the two religions. A 
cleric spoke from the pulpit on three successive nights against the Baha’is, declaring 
that they must convert to Islam or suffer the burning of their homes.108 On the 13th 
of December, a mob gathered at the door of a Baha’i named Sifat Allah Fahandizh 
(d. 1978) who was a low ranking officer in the army. They were intent on dragging 
Fahandizh and his family to the mosque to force them to recant their faith. According 
to some accounts, they also threatened to take away his daughter (in effect, a 
threat of rape, a highly feared taboo in Iranian culture). Fahandizh appealed to law 
enforcement officers for help, but they never arrived. He then went to the rooftop 
105See Akhbar-i Amri, 5 (Khurdad-Tir 1356), 
202-209. For a detailed and heart-wrenching 
account of the murder, see Amini, Asnad-i Ba-
ha’iyan-i Iran, as Sal-i 1332 ta Inqilab-i Islami, 
438-40.
106See Akhbar-i Amri, 11 (1356), 431.
107For more on the life and death of General 
Khadimi see Cyrus ‘Alai, “Chigunigi-i dargu-
zasht-i sipahbud ‘Ali Muhammad Khadimi,” 
Iran Nameh, 30:1 (Spring 2015), 246-262.
108Habib Allah Hakimi’s notes. At the time, 
Hakimi was serving as a member of the Local 
Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Shiraz—a 
position that naturally caused him to pay close 
attention to the events that were unfolding. 
Referring to the Sa‘diyyah incident, Fischer 
writes that “accounts of the attack on Baha’is 
are confused.” The various accounts cited in his 
book reflect this confusion. Fischer, Iran, from 
Religious Dispute to Revolution, 206. Hakimi’s 
notes are a valuable first-hand and accurate re-
cord of that tragic incident.
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of his house. When some among the mob attempted to force down the door to his 
home, he did what the original assailants had wished him to do all along: he shot at 
those attacking him with his gun. In return, both he and his wife were gunned down. 
That a Baha’i had killed Muslims gave the instigators the excuse they had sought. 
Mobs attacked the homes of Baha’is in Sa‘diyyah and set them on fire. News of the 
attacks spread quickly. Mobs of two hundred men or more, all wearing black as part 
of the ‘Ashura mourning ritual, began attacking the homes of Baha’is in Shiraz, one 
street at a time.109 During the next two to three days, around two hundred Baha’i 
homes were raided, plundered and set on fire, as were a significant number of shops 
and factories.110 For the most part, the military forces and police did not interfere 
or actively restrain or oppose the assaulting mobs. In fact, in some cases, the gas 
required to fuel the fire was obtained from military vehicles with the permission 
of military personnel. Fearing that the escalation in violence might get completely 
out of hand, Ayatollah Shaykh Baha’ al-Din Mahallati (d. 1981) at last announced 
that “the habitat, houses, and shops of others must be protected even if they are 
not Muslims, and that religious conflicts must stop.”111 Meanwhile, Ayatollah 
Ruh Allah Khomeini in France112 and Ayatollah Hajj ‘Abd al-Husayn Dastghayb 
(d.1981) in Shiraz113 both accused the Pahlavi regime and its secret police, SAVAK, 
of orchestrating the incident.114 Shortly thereafter, in other parts of Iran, Baha’is 
109Personal recollections of the author.
110A Baha’i living in Shiraz at the time recorded 
that “some 200” Baha’i homes were subject-
ed to arson. See Abu al-Qasim Afnan’s letter to 
Muhammad ‘Ali Jamalzadah in Muhammad Ali 
Homayoun Katouzian, “Du Namah az Jamalza-
dah,” Mihrigan, vol.2, no. 4 (Winter 1372/1994), 
53. A recent study indicates 170 houses and shops 
in Shiraz were burned, and in total 295 were at-
tacked. It also asserts that the extent of the arsons, 
and the accuracy with which the houses of Ba-
ha’is were spotted both indicate a collaboration 
between SAVAK and Hujjatiyyah, the two organi-
zations well informed of the locations of the hous-
es of Baha’is. See Amini, Asnad-i Baha’iyan-i 
Iran, as Sal-i 1332 ta Inqilab-i Islami, 455,458. 
A western scholar has suggested 400 houses and 
shops were looted. See Karen L. Pliskin, “Cam-
ouflage, Conspiracy, and Collaborators: Rumors 
of the Revolution,” Iranian Studies, Vol. XIII, 
Nos. 1-4 (1980): 55-81.
111See the newspaper Pars, no. 4233 (27 Azar 
1357/17 Muharram 1399/18 Dec. 1979). The 
same column titled “The News of Shiraz,” pro-
vides an obliterated and distorted account of the 
events in Sa‘diyyah and Shiraz. For similar an-
nouncements from Ayatollah Mahallati, see Vah-
man, Yik-sad va shast sal, 444-45.
112See Khomeini, Sahifah-’i Nur (Tehran: 
Saziman-i Madarik-i Farhangi-i Inqilab-i Islami, 
1361), 4:79.
113For Ayatollah Dastghayb’s statement, see Pars, 
no. 4242 (2 Bahman 1357/ 22 Jan. 1979), 4. Writ-
ing days after the attacks, Dastghayb clarified 
in this statement that according to Islamic laws, 
whenever an infidel (kafir) lives in the lands of 
Islam, their lives and properties must be protected 
by the Muslim ruler, a principle he applied to “un-
recognized sects” as well.
114The published SAVAK documents pertaining 
to the events contain some inaccuracies. The 
editorial notes added to those documents distort 
the truth, depicting Baha’is as the assailants and 
the murderers. See Inqilab-i Islami bih ravayat-i 
asnad-i SAVAK, vol. 20, 21 Azar to 25 Azar [12 
to 16 Dec.1978] (Tehran: Markaz-i Barrasi-i 
Asnad-i Tarikhi-i Vizarat-i Ittila‘at, 1385/2006), 
146-48, 258-59, 261, 405, 407.
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were also persecuted. A particularly severe case was in Buyr-Ahmad where a series 
of mob attacks began on the night of 12 January 1979/22 Day 1357.115 A number of 
Baha’is were killed in the process, and elsewhere in Iran in the last months of the 
reign of the Pahlavi regime.116 While there is evidence to suggest that the November 
1978 attacks in Sa‘diyyah and Shiraz may have been instigated by SAVAK, with 
regards to these other incidents, in retrospect, it is difficult to know whether it was 
SAVAK instigating the attacks, or whether the clerics and people involved acted on 
their own when they felt there would be no governmental intervention given the 
unrest in the country. 
Conclusion
As far as the treatment by the government, clerics and other citizens was concerned, 
throughout the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, the Baha’i community of Iran 
passed through distinct phases: the first characterized by a lack of physical safety as 
a result of the collaborations between the government and the clerics, culminating 
in the 1955 anti-Baha’i campaign. At the height of the 1955 mass persecution 
of Baha’is, the Shah, concerned about his image abroad and caught between the 
demands of the clerics to escalate the repression of the Baha’i community on the 
one hand, and the need to construct the image of a champion of human rights 
on the other, chose the latter. Indeed, the lessons learned from the international 
repercussions of the 1955 anti-Baha’i campaign seem to have been one of the main 
reasons for the Shah to begin emphasizing human rights as a fundamental thread 
of the Iranian fabric.117 The fact that the international press had accused the Iranian 
government of being partly responsible for some of the attacks and turning a blind 
eye to others made it all the more necessary for the Shah and his government to 
articulate and reiterate their respect for fundamental human rights. In his analysis 
of the repercussions of the 1955 anti-Baha’i campaign, Tavakoli-Targhi discusses 
how a tolerance-based civilizational narrative originally created, decades earlier, by 
the Bar Association of Iran, gradually developed into a more solid grand narrative 
of tolerance and inclusivity in the 1960s.118 Analyzing the history of Iran in the 
115For details, see Geoffrey Nash, “The Perse-
cution of the Baha’i Community of Iran, Rid-
van 1979-Ridvan 1983,” The Baha’i World 
1979-1983 (Haifa, Israel: The Baha’i World 
Center, 1986), 271-74.
116See Nikusifat, Sarkub va kushtar, 2: 35-36 
for details about three of the Baha’is killed 
between 22 Murdad 1357/13 Aug. 1978 to 19 
Dey 1357/9 Jan. 1979, in Jahrum, Mianduab, 
and Hisar Khurasan.
117This was in line with the Shah’s self-image 
as a “progressive,” even “revolutionary” mon-
arch. See Ansari, Modern Iran, 160, 163-4, and 
passim.
118Tavakoli-Targhi, “Charkhish-i Tamadduni,” 
53-57, 85-93.
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decades prior to the Islamic Revolution, Tavakoli-Targhi refers to the continuous 
conflict and confrontation of two governmentalities: a jurisprudential (fiqhi), mono-
confessional, and intolerant governmentality vs. a legal (civil law-based, qanuni), 
multi-confessional, and tolerant governmentality based on the value of “equal 
rights.”119 Using this analytical lens, it can be said that the bloody history of the 
Baha’i community in the 1940s and the early to mid-1950s was the result of the 
jurisprudential governmentality, and the relative safety of the 1960s and early to mid-
1970s the result of the legal, multi-confessional governmentality. In the turbulent 
last two years of Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign, then, the aggression against the 
Baha’i community was again the manifestation of jurisprudential governmentality.
Using the right to be employed in government positions as a point of departure, it 
can be said that, even during the period of the dominance of a tolerance-based, multi-
confessional civilizational grand narrative, the Baha’i community was officially 
deprived of some of its basic civil rights. However, considering the varying ways in 
which regulations governing employment were implemented, the fact that Baha’is 
were free to work in the private sector, that they were, unofficially, allowed to perform 
their religious functions, and that the SAVAK-supported-Hujjatiyyah Society was 
allowed to harass them, we can conclude that life for the Baha’is of Iran during this 
period was far from stable or homogenous. Consequently, the history of the Baha’i 
community of Iran at this time was far from being a linear or monolithic narrative. 
As far as the monarch himself was concerned, despite his strong identification with 
Shi‘ism,120 he did not particularly harbor anti-Baha’i prejudice, given his implicit 
trust in at least two Baha’is, Dr. ‘Abd al-Karim Ayadi, his personal physician, and 
General Asad Allah Sani‘i, the head of his office as Crown Prince and his Minister 
of War as Shah. However, whenever he felt that his power and interests would be in 
danger, he was ready to scapegoats Baha’is, as demonstrated by his sanctioning the 
clerics to start their attacks against Baha’is in 1955 and the events of the turbulent 
closing years of his reign.
In his interpretation of the situation of the Baha’is in the interplay between the 
clerics and the state in modern Iranian history, Roy Mottahedeh suggests that in Iran,
the Baha’is throughout most of their history were a pawn that…governments 
played in their complex game with the mullahs...[N]one of the governments 
 119For a definition of Foucauldian notion 
of “governmentality,” see Tavakoli-Targhi, 
“Charkhish-i Tamadduni,” 55-56; for the dis-
cussion of the historical conflict between these 
two governmentalities, see idem, 55-93.
120See Pahlavi, Answer to History, 57-61.
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was willing to surrender this pawn in a single move …Tolerating Baha’is was 
a way of showing mullas who was boss. Correspondingly, allowing active 
persecution of the Baha’is was the low-cost pawn that could be sacrificed to 
the mullas when the government was in trouble or in special need of mulla 
support.121 
Mottahedeh’s suggestion explains the interaction between the Shah and the clerics 
in relation to the Baha’i community. However, there was also a third element which 
played a crucial role in the social life of Baha’is: everyday Iranian citizens who 
chose to act either as employers who ignored the religion column on official forms 
or as, for example, a chief of police to three different cities where Baha’is were 
murdered with impunity. Today, when the first two elements, the government and 
the clerics have merged into one, some among the third element have begun to 
act in promising ways by not only accepting Baha’is as Iranians rather than Iran’s 
“internal other” but by joining the cohort of those who express their objection to the 
injustices that continue to be perpetrated against the Baha’i community. The rise in 
consciousness by this third element merits further study. 
121Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 238-239.
